






An Empirical Study of Price Dispersion in 







Daniel B. Leiter, Morgan Stanley, New York, USA 


















DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE 
MIDDLEBURY, VERMONT 05753 
 
http://www.middlebury.edu/~econ   2
 
An Empirical Study of Price Dispersion in  
Homogenous Goods Markets 
 
Daniel B. Leiter, Morgan Stanley, New York, USA 





Associate Professor of Economics 
Middlebury College 
Robert A. Jones #115 













   3
 
An Empirical Study of Price Dispersion in  




This paper presents the results of an empirical study of price dispersion in homogeneous goods 
markets. Modern economic theory suggests that inevitable asymmetries of information in markets lead to 
an equilibrium in which price dispersion is present even when goods are perfectly homogenous. In this 
paper we present an empirical analysis in which we employ both cross-sectional and time-series data 
gathered directly from Pricegrabber.com, one of the most popular and comprehensive online 
shopping/price-comparison sites on the Internet. In particular our analysis focuses on (i) the effect that the  
number of firms offering a good has on price dispersion, (ii) the informational value to the consumer of 
using the Pricegrabber website, and (iii) the persistency of price dispersion over time.  
 
JEL Classification: L81, L86, L11 
Keywords: E-commerce, Internet marketing, Price dispersion, Signaling, Search 
Cost, Gatekeepers, Regression and other statistical techniques 
 
Section 1. Introduction 
 
One of the most well known tenets of classical economic theory is that in an 
“ideal” world in which information is perfect, increased competition leads to lower prices 
for consumers. However, the so called “Law of One Price”, where price equals marginal 
cost no longer holds in a more realistic setting, in which information is imperfect, and   4
both consumers and producers are forced to make choices that are marred by uncertainty. 
Informational asymmetries imply that the consumer and producer base is no longer 
homogenous with respect to information. Some consumers are well informed about 
prices. They know for instance, when and where to find sales, which stores have the 
lowest prices on certain goods, and which stores they should be wary of whether due to 
high prices or bad reputation. On the other hand, other consumers do not benefit from this 
information: their cost of acquiring information, also known as “search cost”, is relatively 
high and as a result they tend to buy from whatever retailer they happen to stumble 
across. This informational gap in the consumer base, presents sellers with an opportunity 
to capitalize by selling homogenous goods at different prices. However, the firms 
themselves also have to make decisions under imperfect information. Ideally they would 
like to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. Indeed some 
firms have taken this exact approach; they give special discounts to consumers who   
reach their site through a shopping comparison site, and charge their average consumers a 
higher price for the same goods. Most firms, however, charge a single price, and in doing 
so try to capture both informed and uninformed consumers, a non-trivial feat which has 
been the focus of much research and will be addressed further on in this paper.  
While the extent of price dispersion has traditionally been very hard to measure, 
the rapid spread of the Internet and e-commerce has opened a window into empirical 
research in this field. While it may at first appear that the Internet has done wonders in 
terms of disseminating information, and reducing the informational gap between 
consumers, this may not necessarily be the case. The tremendous increase in the number 
of e-retailers since the birth of the Internet has introduced a lot of noise into the picture.   5
The Internet has also dramatically lowered so called “menu costs”, which are essentially 
the costs associated with listing each item’s price. E-retailers can now update prices 
automatically, depending on demand, inventory, time of the day, etc., which causes 
consumers to face an unprecedented level of price uncertainty. It is therefore plausible 
that, on the whole, this noise actually outweighs the positive information disseminating 
effects of the Internet. 
In this spirit, we set out to analyze numerous aspects of online price dispersion on 
homogeneous goods in more detail. In the following section we present a summary of the 
most important research conducted in this field. In sections 3 and 4 we provide details 
regarding our data, as well as a qualitative analysis, while sections 5 and 6 are dedicated 
to quantitative analysis and results. We then conclude with a short summary of our main 
findings as well as some thoughts on further possible research in this area. 
 
Section 2. Review of the literature 
 
The fundamental importance of information in markets was first emphasized by 
Akerlof (1970) in his seminal paper “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the 
market mechanism”. However, it was not until Salop (1977) and Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977) that economists had a theoretical framework that could explain price dispersion 
based on informational asymmetry. Their model presented a scenario in which natives go 
to eat at the cheapest restaurant in town, while the tourists, not knowing which restaurant 
is the cheapest, simply decide to go to a random one. Their model shows that information 
plays a crucial role for both consumers and restaurant owners. The average tourist can   6
expect to pay a higher price than the natives because only the few tourists who happen to 
randomly select the cheapest restaurant will pay the lowest price. The restaurant owners, 
on the other hand, have to make an important decision when setting their prices: they can 
choose to simply charge a high price and only sell to a fraction of all tourists, or they can 
set their prices so low as to target both natives and tourists. Their choice depends 
primarily on the number of natives compared to tourists, i.e. the fraction of informed 
consumers compared to uninformed consumers. The lower the fraction of informed 
consumers in the population, the less attractive it will be for firms to specifically target 
these consumers, and the stronger the incentive it will have to sell to only uninformed 
consumers. Ultimately the firm will choose its pricing strategy depending on which 
scheme yields more profits.  
A major theoretical step forward in explaining price dispersion was taken by 
Varian (1980). While Salop and Stiglitz had focused on “spatial price dispersion”, where 
experience can help consumers to eventually become informed, Varian studied the case 
of “temporal price dispersion”, in which consumers can only be informed for short 
periods of time, because firms continually change their prices. Varian argues that one of 
the main reasons that firms run sales is to try to keep consumers uninformed about their 
prices. He demonstrates that even in a perfectly competitive market where firms are 
making zero economic profits selling a given homogeneous good, price dispersion will be 
present. In fact, he proves an even more remarkable result, namely that the only 
equilibrium that is sustainable in such a market is one in which firms charge seemingly 
random prices. As Varian himself puts it “the law of one price is no law at all!”   7
While most research in the field of price dispersion had been purely theoretical in 
the past, the advent of the Internet and online gatekeepers has greatly facilitated the 
collection of data for empirical research. Early research in this field focused mainly on 
comparing online price dispersion to that present in conventional retail markets. Some 
economists expected the Internet to be superior to retail markets in terms of efficiency, 
because one may expect that the Internet greatly reduces search costs. In theory, lower 
search costs lead to higher competition between firms, and hence should put downward 
pressure on prices for both homogeneous and differentiated goods. However, when 
talking about online markets, it is especially important to distinguish between search 
costs linked to obtaining price information, and those associated with obtaining product 
and seller information (While the Internet provides consumers with easy access to prices, 
determining the reliability and trustworthiness of the seller may involve considerably 
more effort that in traditional goods markets.)  
Empirical studies in this field have yielded diverse results. Some of the earlier 
studies by Bailey (1998) show that prices are actually higher in electronic markets, while 
more recent similar studies by Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001) show that prices are 
significantly lower than in conventional retail markets. However, all studies to date have 
found that there is a considerable amount of price dispersion in electronic markets.  
One of the reasons for this unexpectedly high level of price dispersion could be 
that the Internet has dramatically reduced menu costs. Menu costs essentially refer to the 
costs associated with (re)labeling products. In traditional markets, the labeling process 
may require a considerable amount of physical work, especially for large firms that sell 
thousands of products. In online markets however, firms incur minimal menu costs, since   8
prices can be updated by simply changing a database entry. In the online marketplace 
firms can even fully automate this process, making it remarkably easy for them to run 
price changes depending on demand, time of day or year, or even availability of the 
product. Moreover, in electronic markets, firms are able to make very small price 
changes, which are infeasible in conventional markets due to relatively large menu costs. 
In fact, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find that online retailers make price changes that 
are up to 100 times smaller than the smallest price changes observed in traditional retail 
markets. 
Some of the most promising recent efforts towards explaining online price 
dispersion have been made by Baye and Morgan (2001). Baye and Morgan (2001) 
present a theoretical framework for understanding the complex economics behind 
gatekeepers. This framework demonstrates how strong network externalities can be in 
such markets and shows why firms actually choose to pay advertising fees to the 
gatekeeper, even if they are unsure of whether their price will be the lowest among the 
listed prices. Their theoretical model has been backed up by both experimental work by 
Morgan et al. (2003) and Baye and Morgan (2004), and empirical research by Baye et al. 
(2004b). The most important empirical finding is that the Internet has not caused prices to 
converge, instead price dispersion has remained persistent over time. Another interesting 
finding is that price dispersion decreases significantly as the number of merchants 
offering a good increases, but still remains persistent. All of their results are based on 
price data on the most popular products appearing on shopper.com, a well-known 
shopping comparison site run by cnet.com.    9
Hence, although the underlying assumptions of the theoretical models of Varian 
(1980), Rosenthal (1980), Narasimhan (1988), and Baye and Morgan (2001) vary, all of 
them predict that price dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon, the size of which 
depends primarily on the number of firms that list their prices. However, there is 
somewhat of a debate in the literature as to what the best measure of price dispersion in 
homogeneous goods markets actually is. Most empirical studies in this field have used 
some measure that takes on a value of zero when all firms in the market charge the same 
price, and there is thus no price dispersion whatsoever. Sorensen (2000) for example uses 
the coefficient of variation (stdev(price)/mean(price)) to measure price dispersion, while 
other studies focus on the price range (the difference between the min and max prices).  
Baye and Morgan (2001) make a compelling argument that these measures may 
not be an ideal way to think of price dispersion, because they do not truly capture the 
degree of competitiveness in the market. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the vast 
majority of users that visit price-comparison sites such as Pricegrabber end up purchasing 
the product at a comparatively low price given that the goods themselves are perfectly 
homogeneous. Thus the only real competitors in the market are the firms that sell at the 
lower end of the price spectrum. As a result it makes sense to define a measure of price 
dispersion that depends on the difference between the lowest prices charged. Baye et al. 
(2004a) define the “Price Gap” (PG) as the percentage difference between the lowest two 
prices. When the gap is zero, i.e. at least two sellers are selling at the same low price; the 
market resembles a Bertrand equilibrium in which no firm can profitably raise its price. 
Note that in any such competitive market the price gap also has the desirable property of 
being 0 independent of the number of firms.    10
Another interesting, yet somewhat untraditional way to measure price dispersion 
is by the informational value to the consumer of knowing what the lowest price is. The 
Value of Information (VI) is defined as the amount that an informed consumer can expect 
to save by purchasing a given good at the lowest available price compared to an 
uniformed consumer, who can expect to pay the average price across all offers for the 
same good. While there is reason to suspect that market thickness should affect the value 
of information, the direction of the relationship may not be clear. Classical economic 
theory predicts that the average price of a good drops as more sellers enter the market and 
competition increases. Thus in a perfectly competitive market the average price will 
equal the minimum price and marginal cost, and the value of information will be zero. Of 
course, traditional theory assumes that buyers do not face informational asymmetries, 
which is of course unrealistic, especially in our setting.  
More suitable oligopolistic models that account for informational heterogeneity 
across the consumer base predict that the value of information will increase as the 
number of firms in the market increases. As more firms enter the market we can expect 
(1) the minimum price of the good to decrease, and (2) the average price to increase (!) 
There is a very sound logical explanation for why this should be the case: On the one 
hand, as the number of firms increases, competition increases as does the likelihood that 
one of the firms will charge a lower price; on the other hand the increase of competition 
implies that it will be harder for firms to target the informed consumers by charging the 
lowest price, and hence knowing that they will most likely sell to uninformed consumers 
whom they can charge a higher price, the average price will increase. To provide the   11
reader with a better understanding of what the distribution of prices may look like, we 
present a slightly modified version of Varian's model below. 
Let n denote the number of firms offering a certain homogeneous good, and I the 
fraction of consumers that are informed, i.e. visit the shopping comparison site. If we 
normalize the price, then Varian's model predicts that the distribution of prices will be 
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Figure 1a and 1b demonstrate what this function looks like for I=0.2, and I=0.5 
respectively for values of n=2,5,10,30. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Distribution of Prices 
 
(a) Distribution of Prices for I=0.2      (b) Distribution of Prices for I=0.5 
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As the number of firms in the market increases so does the average price, because 
more firms choose to price at the higher end of the price spectrum and target only the 
uninformed consumers, since it is less likely that they will end up charging the lowest 
price. However, the fraction of informed consumers in the population also plays a 
fundamental role in determining the distribution of prices. The higher the fraction of 
informed consumers, the greater the incentive for firms to target these consumers, hence 
they price lower on average.  
One of the reasons that the Value of Information is such an interesting measure of 
price dispersion, is that it allows us to measure the cost of dispersion to the consumer. 
Traditionally we tend to think of competitive markets as benefiting the consumer, 
however if the hypothesis is true that the value of information increases as competition 
increases, then two important results follow: Firstly, the informed consumer can expect to 
benefit from higher competition, because the lowest price is expected to drop to an even 
lower level; secondly, the average consumer actually incurs a cost in a more competitive 
market, because the average price that he expects to pay increases. Baye and Morgan 
(2003) find that on average consumers save 16% by buying from the shopper.com price 
comparison site, and that this number increases to 20% for products for which over thirty 
firms compete. This is a truly remarkable finding because it forces us to think of the 
benefits and costs of competition as well as the incredible value that such shopping sites 
provide to consumers.  
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Section 3. Data 
 
Overview 
The data in our study is collected from the popular shopping-comparison site 
Pricegrabber.com. The site was founded in 1999 and has since grown rapidly in 
popularity. Pricegrabber hosts a database of 3.5 million different products, and claims to 
have over 21 million active shoppers on a monthly basis.  The service is free for 
shoppers, but charges an advertising fee to sellers who want to publish their prices. Two 
different pricing-schemes are available to firms: One of them is commission based, while 
the other is based on click rates. Prices are updated twice daily, and include details on 
shipping costs as well as merchant rating.  
Our program runs queries to the Pricegrabber website twice a day, and retrieves 
prices, shipping prices, and the corresponding merchant's rating, the name of the 
merchant as well as other variables described in more detail in the following section. 
Shipping charges are based on the zip code 05753, which is Middlebury Vermont. The 
merchant's rating is a discrete variable that varies from 1 (the worst) to 5 Stars in half unit 
intervals. Please see the appendix for snippets of our code, which explains how these 
queries are invoked and how data is gathered.  
 
Details on Data 
For the purpose of our study we decided to create two separate databases. The 
first database consists of the 200 most popular products that are listed on the Pricegrabber 
website. The second one is a fixed sample that includes products belonging to different 
product categories. While Pricegrabber lists over 15 different categories we only chose to   14
include the top 9, because in the others, products were typically only offered by a single 
firm. The categories we chose are listed below, along with some example products that 
belong to them: 
1.  Computers: Apple iMac 20-inch 2GHz Intel Core Duo Desktop, Logitech 
Z-5500 5.1 Speaker System, Asus A8N32-SLI Deluxe Motherboard 
2.  Electronics: Creative ZEN Vision:M 30GB Media Player - Black, 
Samsung LN-R408D 40'' LCD TV, Motorola Razr V3 Cell Phone - Black 
3.  Video Games: Microsoft Wireless Network Adapter for Xbox 360, 
UbiSoft Prince of Persia: The Two Thrones (PS2), Logitech Driving Force 
Pro (PS2) 
4.  Software: Adobe Acrobat 7.0 Standard, Symantec Norton AntiVirus 2006, 
Adobe Photoshop CS2 
5.  Photography: Panasonic PV-GS150 MiniDV Digital Camcorder, Canon 
PowerShot S80 Digital Camera, Nikon D50 SLR Digital Camera w/ 18-
55mm F/3.5-4.5G Lens 
6.  Office: Texas Instruments TI-89 Titanium Graphing Calculator, Sony 
ICD-BM1 Digital Voice Recorder, Brother FAX-2820 Laser Fax Machine 
7.  Movies: Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire (2005) - DVD, Lord of War 
(2005) - DVD, 12 Monkeys (1995) - DVD 
8.  Books: A Tree Grows in Brooklyn, Freakonomics, The South Beach Diet 
9.  Health: Euphoria for Women by Calvin Klein Eau De Parfum Spray 
1.7oz, Panasonic ES8162S Pro-Curve Elite Shaver, Black Code by 
Giorgio Armani Eau De Toilette Spray 2.5 oz for Men   15
 
Figure 2. Popular products and categories 
 
 
For each of these nine categories we track the prices on a fixed sample of 20 
products per category, thereby making a total of 180 products in the category database. 
The products we chose to include were the most popular products in their respective 
categories as of February 2006. Throughout our study we shall refer to the first dataset as 
POP, and to the second one as CAT. 
Our datasets contain data fetched directly from the Pricegrabber website. This 
data includes information on:   16
1.  Prices: This variable captures the prices that appear right away when a 
consumer searches for a certain product, i.e. they appear independent of 
whether the user inputs his or her zip code. 
2.  Shipping and Handling: These prices only appear after the user inputs a 
zip code. Knowing S&H costs enables us to compute total prices. Note 
that not all firms choose to post their prices, a phenomenon which we will 
study in greater detail in section 7 of this paper. For those that do not 
choose to post prices the words “See Site” appear in the shipping column. 
3.  Merchant Rating: The merchant rating appears next to the name of the 
merchant selling the good. It ranges from 0 to 5 starts in half-star intervals. 
4.  Merchant Name: We also include the actual name of the merchant selling 
the good in our database. This is useful because it allows us to control by 
merchant, and also helps us identify bad merchants, i.e. those that post 
incorrect information. 
5.  Product Category: This information is available for all products in both of 
our datasets, but the dataset containing the most popular products only 
contains goods from one of the top three categories, namely computers, 
electronics, and photography. However, the CAT dataset contains 
products from 9 different market sectors as described above. 
6.  Popularity Ranking: Finally, we also retrieve data on the popularity 
ranking of each product in our POP dataset. Since this dataset contains 
200 products the ranking ranges from 1 to 200. 
   17
Figure 3. A comparison of offerings for the Sony Grand Wega 50" Projection TV 
 
 
Every query provides us with 380 product observations (180 for CAT and 200 for 
POP). Since there are on average around 20 sellers per product we obtain close to a total 
of 8000 individual firm/price observations per query. In total our datasets currently 
include nearly 1,000,000 total price observations and 30,000 product observations.   
From this raw data, we then proceed to calculate a number of interesting statistics 
that relate to various concepts of price dispersion. The most important indicators that we 
employ in our descriptive and econometric analysis are included in the following list:  
1.  Market Thickness:  # MT =  of firms offering a given product. 
2.  The Price Gap is the percentage difference between the two lowest prices 
charged for a given good at a given time. In a market, in which sellers 
attempt to undercut one another this gap should be small. The price gap is 
0 when at least two firms sell at the same lowest price. On the 19th of 
April 2006 for example, the lowest listed price on the Pricegrabber 
website for the Sony PSP system was $192.99, and the second lowest 
price was $212. Therefore the price gap for the good was just over 7%,   18







= , where  1 P  and  2 P  denote the first and second smallest order 
statistics. 
3.  The Relative Dispersion is the Coefficient of Variation in prices charged 
for a given product and is measured in percent. A high value means that 
the standard deviation of the prices charged is high compared to the mean 
of the prices, and that thus there is a considerable amount of price 
dispersion prevalent for the given product. If all sellers charged the same 
exact price then the value of relative dispersion would be 0, the minimum 
possible. On April 25th average price and standard deviation for the Nikon 
CoolPix L4 Digital Camera were $144 and $14 respectively. Hence the 
coefficient of variation was approximately 9.5%, which is very close to 






















4.  The Value of Information measures the percentage savings of an informed 
consumer, who buys at the lowest price compared to an uninformed 
consumer, who buys at the average price. A high value of this variable 
implies that informed consumers benefit greatly from knowing which firm 
is charging the lowest price. On the 19th of April the average price for the 
Canon PowerShot A620 Silver Digital Camera was $301, while the 
minimum price was a low $251, meaning that the value of information   19
was just about 20%. Therefore an uninformed consumer, who did not 
search for the lowest price of the camera, could expect to pay 20% more 








5.  The Price Range is the percentage difference in the maximum and 
minimum prices charged for a given product. When price dispersion is 
high the price range is high. If all sellers charged the same price the price 
range would be 0. On the 26th of April the price range for the Western 
Digital Raptor hard drive, for example, was relatively small at just 29%, 
meaning that the highest price charged was just 29% more expensive than 
the lowest price charged. The average price range in our CAT dataset is 









Section 4. Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section we present summary statistics as well as general trends of our data. 
We do so to provide a better overview and understanding of the data, before going into 
actual quantitative analysis in the following section. 
 
Trends across Product Categories 
The main importance of the CAT dataset lies in the fact that it contains products 
from 9 different categories. The question of interest is whether we can detect systematic 
differences in price dispersion across market sectors, and if so, whether we can also   20
explain the reason for these differences. Economic theory does not explicitly suggest that 
such differences should exist, however there may be a number of reasons as to why they 
might arise. The most obvious explanation may be that the number of online retailers 
varies from one category to the next, implying a more or less competitive market 
structure. Another reason may be that computers are much more expensive than books, 
and that people might therefore be more willing to incur search costs when shopping for 
computers, and not really bother to look around for the lowest price when they buy a 
book. A much more subtle explanation could be that the consumer base for computers is 
generally better informed than consumers that buy books online. If this were the case we 




Figure 4. Average price across product categories 
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The average price for our CAT dataset across all products and product categories 
is $339.51. However, the average varies tremendously depending on product category. 
Books for example only cost $24 on average, while the average price for electronics is an 
impressive $1450. Products in the computer and photography categories are on average 
priced above $500, while those belonging to the remaining categories have average prices 




Figure 5 depicts the average shipping charged by firms across all product 
categories, as well as the standard deviation and the average % of shipping costs relative 
to the price.   
 
Figure 5. Shipping across product categories 
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Shipping costs on electronics appear to be much higher than for the other 
categories. In fact, the average shipping cost for electronics is $74.20, over 8 times that of 
the second highest average of $9.16 for computer products. One explanation as to what 
could be the reason for such a dramatic difference, may be that these items are heavier 
than the goods in other categories and thus cost more to ship. Indeed around half of the 
products in popular electronics are large screen 32'' to 50'' televisions, and the standard 
deviation is huge which  further supports the idea that it is truly these heavy TV sets that 
are pulling up the average. Furthermore, when we compare shipping costs to prices, the 
electronics category is no longer the leader, in fact it only ranks 6th, with shipping 
accounting for just over 5% of total price. Thus shipping costs on electronics are perhaps 
not as unreasonable as they appear at first glance. 
 
Market Thickness 
Before taking a closer look at how our price dispersion statistics vary across 
categories, we look at differences in market thickness, across product sectors to get a 
better idea of how many firms on average compete per category. Market thickness is 
essentially an indication of the level of competition in the market. The average market 
thickness over all products and product categories is 17.5, implying that on average 
between 17 to 18 firms offer a given homogeneous good. This remarkably high number is 
likely due to the fact that the products in our category database are popular products in 
their respective sectors. Market thickness does, however, vary considerably across 
categories as demonstrated in Figure 6. Electronics, photography and software all have on 
average over 20 firms selling a given product, while computers, video games, office, and   23
health have between 15 and 20. The laggards are movies and books, which on average 
have less than 10 firms competing per product.  
 




The average price gap in our category dataset is 5.6%, but the real question of 
interest here is whether price dispersion varies depending on the product category and the 
number of firms that list prices. In Figure 7 market thickness is plotted next to the price 
gap for each individual category. From the graph we see that in general the price gap 
(thick bar) is low when market thickness is high (thin bar), which is consistent with both 
economic theory and findings in previous studies. The price gap is lowest for the 
photography category (1.36%), which is by far the most competitive sector in terms of 
the number of firms competing.  
   24
Figure 7. Price gap vs. market thickness across product categories 
 
 
Note that the price gap for the software category is the largest of all at 11.42%, 
even though this appears to be a very competitive market. This somewhat puzzling result 
seems to be the only one that doesn't fit the picture. One explanation may be that firms 
may not truly be offering homogeneous goods even though they advertise so. For 
example one firm may be offering the full software package including CD, manual, and 
other goodies, while another may be offering the same piece of software, but for 
download only. We searched through our database in order to detect whether there were 
any specific products that were leading to this bizarre result and found that in fact, 
Microsoft products had an abnormally large price gap compared to other software 
products. If we disregard software, then books and movies have the largest price gaps, 
which meets our expectations since they have the fewest number of firms competing per 
product. 
   25
Value of Information 
The average value of information in our CAT dataset is 23.12%, meaning that a 
consumer can expect to save nearly one forth of the total price just by using the 
Pricegrabber website as a search tool. This is a truly impressive number, especially 
considering that Pricegrabber's comparison service is entirely free for buyers. However, 
Figure 8 demonstrates that the informational value of the site varies a lot between product 
categories. Our data shows that the consumers that benefit the most from the Pricegrabber 
service are those looking to buy software, video games, books, and movies. These 
consumers can save on average from 25% to over 40% just by doing a simple search. 
 




While we hypothesized that higher market thickness should cause the average 
price to go up and the minimum price to go down leading to an increase in informational 
value, it is somewhat unclear from the graph as to whether this proposition truly holds. In   26
section 5 and 6 we shall formally test whether the number of firms in the market and the 
value of information really are positively correlated. 
 
Trends over time 
Our analysis in the previous section was based on averages calculated over a two 
month timeframe, namely from March to April 2006. We now turn our attention towards 
detecting possible trends in price dispersion over time. One of the most interesting 
questions of our study regards the persistency of price dispersion. As noted previously, 
modern economic theory suggests that a market in which price dispersion is present may, 
in fact, be in a state of equilibrium. If this were so then we should not be able to detect 
any particular time related trends in our data on popular products. In other words, if price 
dispersion is in equilibrium then it should remain fairly constant over time. Four different 
series are depicted in Figure 11, each of which represent the percentage of products in our 
POP dataset that have a price gap of greater than 10% 5% 1% and 0.5% respectively. The 
graph demonstrates that there does not appear to be any significant trend over the past 
two months for any of the series. This is consistent with the findings of other researchers, 
particularly Baye and Morgan (2003). Our findings show that an impressive 45% have a 
price gap of under 0.5%, 10% have a price gap between 0.5% and 1%, 30% have a gap 
that lies somewhere in the 1% to 5% range, while the remaining 15% have a gap over 
5%.     27
Figure 9. Price gap over time across product categories 
 
 
These gaps are somewhat lower than those found in previous research, which may 
have to do with the fact that these are the 200 most popular products on the Pricegrabber 
website, thus market thickness and competition are generally higher than for your 
average good. To determine whether this hypothesis does indeed hold, we plotted a 
similar graph for our CAT dataset, in which the average popularity of the products is far 
lower. Figure 10 lets us suspect that popularity has a significant effect on the price gap. 
Nearly 20% of the products in our CAT dataset have a price gap of more than 10%, and 
around 35% have a price gap of over 5%. These numbers are 3 to 4 times higher than the 
corresponding values of the POP dataset. Also, note that the fraction of products in CAT 
that have a competitive price gap of 0% is only 25%, compared to over 40% in POP.   
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Figure 10. Cumulative price gap over time 
 
(a)  POP  dataset      (b)  CAT  dataset 
 
Similar results hold for the informational value of the Pricegrabber site. Figure 11 
depicts the average value of information during the timeframe of this study. The graph 
clearly demonstrates that the average VI stayed relatively constant, taking on a value of 
around 22% and 15% for the CAT and POP datasets respectively. 
 
Figure 11. Value of information over time 
 
Average value of information over time 
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Trends by Popularity and Market Thickness 
As discussed above, we expect market thickness to have a significant impact on 
the competitiveness of the market, and as a result also on the price gap. In Figure 7, we 
saw that the price gap varied across categories for the most part according to how market 
thickness changed. We shall now focus on the effect of market thickness alone on price 
dispersion, i.e. independent of product category. In Figure 12, we plot the price gap 
versus market thickness. As expected, the graph shows a very clear inverse relationship 
between the price gap and market thickness. 
 
Figure 12. Price gap and value of information across market thickness 
   
(a) Price gap vs. market thickness    (b) Value of information vs. market thickness 
 
Overall the price gap decreases dramatically as the number of firms in the market 
increases (the large spike at 16 is most likely due to lack of observations of products for 
which exactly 16 firms compete). The decrease is largest when there are just a few firms 
competing, whereas after the market thickness goes to above 20 firms its effect on the 
price gap becomes negligible. This supports the idea that the firms that compete on   30
Pricegrabber are not truly in a Bertrand equilibrium, but rather act as a monopolies or 
oligopolies and exert market power.  
Figure 12 demonstrates that as market thickness increases the value of 
information appears to increase as well, although the relationship seems to be weak. 
However, there may be two effects determining the value of information here, namely a 
market thickness effect as well as a popularity effect.  
 
Figure 13. Price gap and market thickness versus popularity 
 
 
In Figure 13, we plot the price gap versus both popularity and the average market 
thickness per popularity category. The graph demonstrates that there is also a similar 
inverse relationship between the price gap and popularity. However, it is also evident 
from the plot that the average market thickness decreases with popularity.   31
In section 5 we employ econometric analysis to determine whether the effect of 
popularity on the price gap and value of information truly exists, or if we are in fact just 
witnessing a market thickness effect. 
 
Section 5. Quantitative analysis 
 
From the summaries of the previous section it appears that the data exhibits 
various interesting phenomena on both the individual firm and aggregate product level. In 
order to test whether these phenomena are systematic and truly matter, we employ 
econometric analysis. The propositions we wish to test are as follows: 
 
Proposition 1. Market thickness and the price gap are inversely related: A higher 
market thickness will lead to a smaller price gap and vice-versa. 
 
As the number of firms offering the same homogeneous good increases we expect 
the market to become more competitive, which should be reflected by a smaller price 
gap. This proposition has been tested in previous studies, most notably Baye and Morgan 
(2003), in which the authors found that market thickness did indeed have a highly 
significant inversely proportional effect on price dispersion.  
 
Proposition 2.  Market thickness and the value of information are positively 
related: A higher market thickness will lead to a higher value of information and vice-
versa.   32
 
As the number of firms in the market increases Varian's model predicts that the 
minimum price will decrease, while the average price will increase. Hence we should 
notice an increase in the value of information as market thickness increases. 
While these are our only formal hypotheses, we are also interested in the possible 
effects of popularity and market sector on the price gap and the value of information. 
Baye and Morgan (2003) show that a fraction of the observed price dispersion across 
products is solely due to differences in popularity of the products, although the magnitude 
of the “popularity effect” is negligibly small compared to the effect of market thickness. 
To the best of our knowledge we are the first researchers to conduct an analysis by 
market sector, which makes our findings particularly interesting. 
 
Methodology 
We test proposition 1 on both of our datasets. For our fixed sample of products 
(category dataset) we set up a basic model in which we regress the price gap (PG) on 
market thickness (MT) and only control for product fixed effects (PROD). From there we 
incrementally add dummies to capture fixed effects across product category and time. 
Our models for this dataset are therefore as follows: 
  0 it m it p it it
MT prod
PG MT PROD α ααε =+ + + ∑∑  (2) 
  0 it m it p it c it it
MT prod cat
PG MT PROD CAT β ββ β ν =+ + + + ∑∑ ∑  (3) 
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  0 it m it p it c it t it it
MT prod cat time
PG MT PROD CAT TIME γ γγ γγ ω =+ + + + + ∑∑ ∑∑  (4) 
 
For our popular products dataset, we use the same approach, but also control for 
product popularity. However, the disadvantage of this dataset is that nearly all of the top 
200 most popular products on Pricegrabber belong to the photography, electronics, or 
computer category, which of course limits our analysis to just these categories. 
The only difference between the models presented above and the ones we employ 
for our analysis of the main determinants of the value of information, is that we exchange 
the dependent variable, price gap, with the value of information. Otherwise our approach 
to testing proposition 2 is identical to that of proposition 1. 
 
Section 6. Results 
 
Price Gap 
In Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 we present the estimates of equations (2), (3) and 
(4), and for our fixed sample (CAT dataset).  Please note that in each table we have 
suppressed the coefficients of dummies for more than 30 firms as well as all product and 
time dummies. These are of course available upon request. The estimated coefficients 
represent the differences from our base category, which is 57 firms, an incredibly high 
market thickness.  
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Table 1. Dependent variable: price gap - fixed effects: product 
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Table 2. Dependent variable: price gap - fixed effects: product, category 
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Table 3. Dependent variable: price gap - fixed effects: product, category, time 
 
 
The results support the hypothesis that there is a strong inverse relationship 
between market thickness and the price gap. Overall our model can explain around 71% 
of the total variation in the price gap. The model predicts that when just two or three 
firms compete the price gap will be higher than 10%. It is interesting to see just how 
quickly the gap shrinks. With just 10 firms in the market the gap is already below 6%, 
and as of 14 firms it remains between 3 to 5 percent.   37
These estimates barely change when we add category and time fixed effects. Note 
that the hypothesis that all time fixed effects are zero in the last model yields a p-value of 
0.0741, indicating that the time dummies are insignificantly different from zero at a 5% 
level, hence price dispersion does not appear to diminish over time; instead it appears to 
be persistent over time, a result that confirms findings in previous literature. 
Another interesting result is that there do appear to be systematic differences 
between product categories. Moreover, some of the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
very large. It appears that products in the categories health, software and movies have 
particularly high price gaps, compared to the other categories. To the best of our 
knowledge we are the first to test for category specific effects. It is therefore hard to say 
whether this result should hold in general, or whether this phenomenon is limited to the 
Pricegrabber website.  
When we ran the regressions on the data from the POP dataset, the effect of 
popularity on the price gap was negligibly small, which confirms the hypothesis that 
there is no real popularity effect on the price gap. The true reason that we generally 
observe smaller price gaps for popular products therefore appears to be that the more 
popular products on average have a greater market thickness than less popular ones (see 
Figure 13). 
 
Value of Information 
In the following tables we present the estimates for the value of information based 
on models that are similar to the ones we used for the price gap. Table 4, Table 5, and 
Table 6 display the results for the fixed sample (CAT dataset). 
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Table 4. Dependent variable: value of information - fixed effects: product 
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Table 5. Dependent variable: value of information - fixed effects: product, category 
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Table 6. Dependent variable: value of information - fixed effects: product, category, time 
 
 
The results show a very strong positive relationship between market thickness and 
the value of information, which, of course, confirms the proposition that we stated in the 
previous section. In fact, our model can explain nearly 90% of the total variation in the   41
VI, indicating that the number of firms offering a good is an even better indicator of the 
value of information than of the price gap, of which around 70% could be explained. 
The expected value of information when only two firms compete is only 10%, but 
this number quickly increases to over 20% for just 10 firms. From there it increases 
gradually to approximately 30% for 30 firms, after which it no longer significantly 
increases no matter how many firms are in the market. As was the case for our price gap 
results, adding fixed effects for categories and time barely changes our estimated 
coefficients and expected means.  
An interesting finding here is that the variation of the value of information across 
product categories is very large. For example an informed consumer that buys a camera 
can only expect to save around 5% over an uninformed consumer, while he or she can 
expect to save an amazing 58% when buying an electric razor, and nearly 40% when 
buying a DVD.  
When we ran these regressions on the POP dataset, while adding controls for 
popularity, our findings were similar to those we made for the price gap. Popularity alone 
does not seem to have any real effect on the value of information. 
 
Section 7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyzed price dispersion on homogeneous goods that is reflected 
on the Pricegrabber.com shopping comparison site. Our research confirms past findings 
regarding the determinants of price dispersion on other online gatekeepers. We also   42
found that that price dispersion varies systematically across market sectors, and that the 
Pricegrabber service provides tremendous informational value to its users.  
Our results provide strong supporting evidence regarding the validity of Varian's 
model in which the number of sellers of a given good has a large impact on price 
dispersion. Both the percentage gap between the two lowest offerings and the gap 
between the lowest and average offering depend primarily on the market thickness, 
although the direction of the effects differ as expected. The price gap is large when there 
are just a few firms competing in the market, but rapidly decreases as the market becomes 
more competitive.  
The value of information depends even more strongly on the number of firms than 
the price gap. With just 2 firms in the market, consumers that inform themselves about 
prices by visiting the Pricegrabber site can expect to save just 10% more than consumers 
that buy from a random online retailer. However, this number increases to an impressive 
30% when 30 or more firms post offerings. 
These findings are consistent with previous findings, most notably those of Baye 
et al. (2004a), despite the fact that their data comes from a completely different source 
(shopper.com) and is nearly 5 years old. It appears that passage of time and the maturing 
of online retail markets has had no effect whatsoever on the persistency of price 
dispersion, that price dispersion is in fact, as modern economic theory suggests, an 
equilibrium phenomenon which results from asymmetries of information in these 
markets. 
Price dispersion also varies across market sectors and popularity ranking. While 
the magnitude of the effect of popularity on price dispersion is negligible, the same   43
cannot be said for product categories. In fact, our results show that even after controlling 
across products, and time, there is considerable variation between different categories. 
Dispersion is generally largest for health products, while it is small for products 
belonging to the photography category.  
In future studies it would be useful to further delve into the possible reasons for 
the systematic differences of dispersion across categories, and test whether these are also 
present on other online gatekeepers. It would also be interesting to devise new measures 
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